









I.  Introduction: Philo and His Project 
 
The Jewish exegete Philo of Alexandria’s (c. 20 BCE to c. 50 CE) debt to Plato is enormous.* 
Philo’s central project, the allegorical interpretation of the five books of Moses in the Septuagint, 
would be inconceivable without the contribution of the Athenian philosopher, and Greek culture in 
general.1 Philo’s relation to his two-fold heritage has given rise to debates for centuries.  
Before we look at the different ways Philo utilizes Plato in his project, it is warranted to 
briefly outline his enterprise. Most of his ca. 40 surviving works, written in Attic-influenced Greek, 
deal with interpreting the Pentateuch and belong to one of three different commentary series.2 (1) In 
the Quaestiones (sc. in Genesim and in Exodum) Philo goes through the biblical text verse by verse 
presenting questions about the meaning, and answering both on the basis of the literal and then 
concerning the allegorical interpretation. The Quaestiones is probably the series he wrote first.3 (2) 
Almost half of Philo’s works belong to what is called the Allegorical Commentary (on Genesis). The 
literal meaning is here mostly just the starting point for allegories of often considerable complexity 
the main subject of which is the human soul. There are signs (e.g., references to initiates) that this 
series was intended for a select audience only.4 (3) The third series, the Exposition of the Law, is the 
most exoteric one, and it covers parts of all the five books of Moses focusing, in particular, on the 
creation, the patriarchs and the injunctions of the Mosaic Law. Typical of the first two subject areas 
is the alternation of rewritten biblical stories and their allegorizations. 
The remaining handful of works consist of philosophical, historical and apologetic writings, 
many of considerable interest (e.g., Philo’s retelling of the life of Moses in two books). Almost 25% 
of the corpus has survived, apart from some Greek and Latin fragments, only in a sixth-century 
Armenian translation, and perhaps one-third has been lost altogether. 
Philo’s treatises differ from Plato’s in many ways. His works contain little narrative material, 
and we find nothing comparable to the Socratic irony in Philo.5 His two dialogues, the De animalibus 
and the De providentia II, are quite unlike Plato’s.6 They focus on a thesis rather than a topic and 
consist of fairly long speeches of argument and counter-argument. The method of Socratic 
questioning is absent. 
 
                                               
* I thank David T. Runia for his valuable comments on a draft version of this essay. All the remaining infelicities are 
exclusively my responsibility. 
1 For Philo’s education and his use of Greek literature, see, e.g. Koskenniemi (2014) and the references there. 
2 For a good introduction to Philo’s works and their classification, see Royse (2009). His corpus is of the same order as 
Plato’s. Sometimes the different books of certain Philonic treatises are counted as separate works, which raises the total to 
c. 50. 
3 See Terian (1991). The allegory in the Quaestiones is often quite unelaborated when compared with the later series. 
4 See, e.g., Burnett (1984), 449-50. 
5 E.g., the mocking of Egyptian religion in Decal. 79-80 would be an apposite passage for sarcasm, but we find Philo 
simply calling for horrification and pity as the appropriate reactions to animal worship. 
6 For these, see Terian (2008), who sees Philo relying on parts of the Phaedrus in Anim. (see pp. 276-81).  
 
 
1) Philo’s Relation to Plato in Historical Perspective 
That Plato was for Philo a major reservoir of both philosophy and language has been 
recognized since antiquity. The first surviving reference to him, by Josephus, says he was “not 
inexperienced in philosophy” (AJ 18.259). The church historian Eusebius tells us that in addition to 
mastering all of Jewish theology Philo was “related to have surpassed all his contemporaries, 
especially in his zeal for the study of Plato and Pythagoras” (Hist. eccl. 2.4.3).7 Jerome for his part is 
the first one to record the proverb, “Either Plato philonizes or Philo platonizes” (De viris illustribus 
11.7).8 
How the relationship of the two thinkers was seen in Byzantium and the medieval period in 
the West has not been much studied until recently.9 The bon mot continued to be circulated.10 In 
some Philonic manuscripts there are marginalia critical of clearly Platonic ideas, even omissions of 
passages that contain them.11 Yet Philo was still an “honorary Church father.”12 His allegorical 
method did receive criticism, e.g., from Martin Luther, but this was not connected with his 
Platonism.13 
During the 16th century the accessibility of Philo’s works increased as they began to be 
printed. The connection between the Philonic allegory and Platonism could be seen more clearly, 
which caused criticism.14 Among the many assessments of Philo’s Platonism we may mention the 
one by the important and skillful editor of Philo, Thomas Mangey.15 He crystallizes his view in the 
foreword to his 1742 edition of Philo’s oeuvre in the form of a selection of Platonic doctrines in Philo 
as follows: the ideal of assimilation to God, the notion of the creation of the world in accordance with 
the invisible ideas, the pre-existence of souls and reincarnation, the tripartition of the human soul and 
the four cardinal virtues as well as the notion that the stars and the world itself are living beings. His 
judgment is that Philo “does not show himself to be so much an interpreter of Moses but a pupil of 
gentile philosophy, principally a devotee of Plato’s.”16 
The 19th and 20th centuries saw Philo’s Platonism contextualized, as he began to be seen as 
part of a larger whole now called “Middle Platonism.” John Dillon has shown that Philo provides us 
                                               
7 Philo has little reception history within Judaism between Josephus and Azariah de’ Rossi (see below). After the former, 
the reception and transmission of Philo takes place among the Platonist church fathers beginning with Clement of 
Alexandria and Origen. 
8 On this saying, see Runia (1993a), 313-5. 
9 See now Runia (2016). 
10 It is cited with implicit approval by the patriarch Photius in the 9th century (Bibliotheca, cod. 105). Also the Byzantine 
scholar and statesman Theodore Metochites (d. 1332) is familiar with it, but he rejects it saying that Philo did not match 
Plato (Semeioseis gnomikai 16.2). The first Jew to write in the 1570s a comprehensive assessment of Philo, Azariah de’ 
Rossi accepts the saying (2001), 111. Like Photius (but for different reasons) he has doubts about Philo’s orthodoxy, but 
neither of them links this with Philo’s Platonism (idem, 158). 
11 E.g., the MS. Monacensis Graecus 459 contains many such scholia by a 15th-century hand (see Cohn et al. [1896], 
1.vi-vii for quotations). Philo’s heavily Platonizing locus classicus on reincarnation in Somn. 1.137-139 is carefully 
omitted in this 13th-century ms. On this passage, see below, n. 50. 
12 Runia (1993a), 31. 
13 Luther (1895), 560. The details of the reception of Philo, and its possible dependence on that of Plato, by the different 
parties of the Reformation are to a large extent an unexplored territory. The same applies to Eastern Christendom, at least 
as far as studies published in the West are concerned. 
14 Important works critical of Philo were Petavius (1745) (published originally in 1643) and Fabricius (1693). The former 
was a Jesuit, the latter, a Lutheran. 
15 For a perceptive overview of other evaluations, see J. L. Mosheim’s essay-length footnote in Cudworth (1845) 
(appeared originally in 1678), 320-33. Mosheim’s view is that “the primary and fundamental doctrines of Plato are 
expressly put forth” by Philo (p. 321). See also Billings (1919), 1-12. 
16 Mangey (1742), vii- viii; my tr. 
 
 
with good evidence for this phase of Platonism with its Pythagorean, Stoic and Aristotelian 
influences.17 Yet there is no consensus of whether Philo, given his exegetical orientation, should be 
called a Middle Platonist, and, if so, in what sense. For example, although Dillon characterizes 
Moses, as interpreted by Philo, as “a great Middle Platonist,” he does not consider Philo a 
philosopher in his own right.18  
The key question regarding Philo’s dual orientation is if he pursues “exegetical philosophy” 
or “philosophically orientated exegesis,” i.e., ultimately, whether it is Plato or Moses who carries the 
day in Philo’s thought.19 Both views have had their defenders. David Winston has argued that Philo 
could just as well have written philosophical tractates on biblical themes, but that he chose the form 
of scriptural commentary in order to convince his audience that the philosophical ideas that abound in 
his allegories are embedded in the Pentateuch.20 In Winston’s view the “midrashic/allegorical 
character” of Philonic exegesis also allows a considerable amount of eis-egesis, reading things into 
scripture, which is why it is misleading to call Philo primarily an exegete.21 The counterpoint, 
represented, e.g., by David T. Runia, is that Philo simply “discerns fundamental Greek philosophical 
assumptions within scripture itself” and that despite Philo’s debt to Greek thought “he [often] speaks 
of God with spirituality quite different in flavor to that found in the works of Greek philosophers.”22 
We will return to evaluating these positions in the last part of this essay. 
 
2) Philo’s References to Plato and Socrates 
When we try to establish what Philo thought of Plato, we have two sets of sources: the direct 
characterizations and the way in which Plato’s thought is actually used (for which see below). There 
are a total of 23 instances of the name Plato in the Philonic corpus.23 What is common to these (with 
one exception) is a positive attitude. Plato is also many times referred to anonymously, ranging from 
“one of the ancients” (Her. 181) to just “someone” (Spec. 2.249). The name of Socrates—the only 
historical person of significance for Philo in Plato’s works—is mentioned less often than Plato’s.24 
While Philo may speak of Socrates without mentioning Plato, the former does not have a clearly 
distinguishable voice of his own. The reference to “a man highly esteemed, one of those admired for 
their wisdom” in the context of a rare, explicit quotation from Tht. 176ab in Fug. 63 could mean 
either, but the more likely referent is Socrates.25 
                                               
17 Dillon (1996), 439. Philo is discussed in this book, which originally appeared in (1977), on pp. 139-183 and 438-441.  
18 Idem, 439, 143. 
19 The distinction in the form quoted is from Runia (1986), 544. 
20 Winston (1981), 2-3. He compares this to Plato’s using the “teasing dialectic” of the dialogue form. 
21 Winston (2005), 15. 
22 Runia (1993b), 128; 1986, 541. The latter point is also brought up in Dillon (1996), 143. 
23 Opif. 119, 133; Prob. 13; Contempl. 57, 59; Aet. 13, 14, 16, 17, 27, 38, 52, 141, Prov. 1.20-22, 2.42, 52, 56; QG 1.6, 
3.3; QE 2.118. (For Prov., the numbering is for Aucher’s edition of the Armenian.) For concise overviews of Philo’s 
references to, of and quotations from Plato, see Runia (1986), 366-70 and Sterling (2014), 138-9. The De aeternitate 
mundi and the De providentia belong to the philosophical treatises, to which the Quod omnis probus liber sit should be 
added, which differ from the majority of the Philonic writings in the degree of openness of references to Greek sources. 
24 There are eight instances in total: Somn. 1.58; Contempl. 57; Prov. 2.8, 24 (2.21 in PLCL), 42; QG 2.3, 2.6, 3.3. A few 
of the references are to Xenophon: Paramelle (1984) gives Memorabilia 1.4.12 and 1.4.6-7 for the references in QG 2.3 
and 2.6, respectively. When referring to Phdr. 246e in QG 3.3 Philo speaks of “the Socratic Plato”—an expression used 
before him by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (De Demosthenis dictione 3.8 and De compositione verborum 16.22). 
25 Philo mentions Socrates’ being admired for his wisdom in Plant. 80 and Prov. 2.8. Cf. also Xenophon, Mem. 4.2.3 and 
Tht. 161c where Socrates uses the same expression (although not of himself). For the deviations from the received 
Platonic text in this and twenty-one other Platonic citations in the Philonic corpus, see Runia 1997. 
 
 
One case of naming Plato is particularly interesting. Does Philo really call him “the most 
holy” (ἱερώτατον) in Prob. 13—an epithet usually reserved to Moses? This reading of a single 
manuscript was accepted by Mangey and Cohn; the other mss. have λιγυρώτατον.26 The passage 
contains citations from Phdr. 247a and 243d. Colson’s observations about the scene of the dialogue 
as λίγυρος (230c) and the Muses as λίγειαι (237a) are relevant, but do not explain why Plato would 
be called “most musical” or “clear-voiced,” as he renders. I think the answer lies in the relation of the 
cicadas (which Philo actually mentions in §8) and the Muses to the art of speaking well; see esp. 
258d-262d. Philo is using a Phaedrus-inspired adjective to praise Plato’s style.27  
There is one place in Philo’s works where Plato himself is subjected to what may be called 
criticism. In his laudatory description of the monastic community of the so-called therapeutai and 
therapeutrides Philo makes it a point to describe their “convivial meals as contrasted with those of 
other people” (Contempl. 40), also the Symposia by Xenophon and Plato (§§ 57-64). Philo describes 
both banquets as “matters for derision,” if compared with those of the Therapeutae (§58). 
Xenophon’s are briefly described as occasions for merry-making, whereas Plato’s get more attention 
with pederasty at its center. While the practice is denounced in strong terms (§§ 59-62), Philo treats 
both authors in a noteworthily delicate manner, calling them “men whose character and discourses 
showed them to be philosophers” (§57).28 The criticism is carefully targeted at their judgment of the 
symposia as being “models of the happily conducted banquet” (ibid.) but even this criticism is left 
implicit. Plato’s references to pederasty do not, on the whole, seem important for Philo, let alone a 
hindrance for using the philosopher’s ideas.29  
It has been suggested that Philo so rarely mentions Plato’s name in his exegetical treatises 
because he wanted to avoid the obvious.30 This may be part of the explanation. Regardless, the 
phenomenon should be seen in light of a more general avoidance of name-dropping.31 As for Plato in 
particular, giving a reference each time to a Platonic idea or expression was utilized would have been 
highly impractical, given Philo’s constant use of the philosopher as a source of both major notions 
(e.g., the creation of the universe according to an intelligible model) and a plethora of terms and 
images. It is also worth noting that Philo’s text can be read without knowledge of his sources, but that 
if these are recognized, a new level of interpretation appears as the contexts of the borrowings dawn 
on the audience.32 
 
                                               
26 Runia (1997), 276 calls for “very serious consideration” for this latter reading as lectio difficilior, whereas Sterling 
(2016), 37 argues in favor of the former as the more difficult reading.  
27 That a scribe might substitute “most holy” is understandable, if he did not know the Phaedrus and in light of the fact 
that the reference to Plato in §13 is substantially connected to the reference to “the saintly company (ἱερώτατον θίασον) 
of the Pythagoreans” in §2.—Interestingly, Prob. 13 also seems to contain a retort to Aristophanes who in the Clouds 
portrays the door of Socrates’ “school of thought” (φροντιστήριον) as locked (ll. 132-183); cf. Philo “wisdom . . . never 
closes her school of thought (φροντιστήριον).” Philo is the first author after Aristophanes to use this word and does so 
only here. 
28 There are inaccuracies in Philo’s criticism, in particular with regard to the distinction between popular and heavenly 
love introduced in Pausanias’s speech (181c-185e). See Colson’s notes ad loc. 
29 It remains unclear whether Philo knew the condemnation of homoerotic behavior in the Laws (e.g., 636c, 838e). He 
does use partly similar language (see Abr. 135; Spec. 2.50, 3.37, 39; Contempl. 59, 62) but does not appeal to Plato. 
30 Runia (1997), 270-71. However, Philo several times anonymously alludes to Socrates in a way that presupposes no 
knowledge of him (Deus 146, Plant. 65) or the Apology (a reference to 21d at Plant. 80). 
31 E.g., Homer is mentioned by name only once in the Allegorical Commentary (Conf. 4), whereas the Odyssey and the 
Iliad are referred to almost 30 times.  
32 Philo’s use of Plato’s reincarnational texts is an excellent example. Philo is reluctant to explain the tenet openly, and 
his veiled references to it can (and continue to) be read ignoring the original contexts of their Platonic elements. See Yli-
Karjanmaa (2015), 111-27. 
 
 
3) The Corpus Used 
There are large differences in how frequently Philo uses Plato’s various dialogues. Comparing 
the 700 references to Plato’s works in Billings’ 1919 work on Philo’s Platonism with the c. 200 in the 
notes of the first ten volumes of the English translation of Philo’s oeuvre in the Loeb Classical 




With the exception of the Timaeus and the Republic there is fair convergence between 
Billings and the Loeb edition, although the differences in approach mean that the comparison is 
suggestive only. In total, Billings refers to 25 dialogues, the PLCL to 15. In Runia’s grand study on 
Philo’s use of the Timaeus, the top six non-Timaean dialogues are the same as above with the 
exception that the Statesman replaces the Symposium.33 
The frequency of usage naturally varies according to subject matter. In Méasson’s monograph 
on Platonic images and myths in Philo special attention is given to the Phaedrus, which, together 
with the Timaeus, constitutes almost 60% of her references, the top seven being the same as in 
Runia.34 In my own study on Philo’s position on reincarnation the four dialogues clearly referred 
most often to make up 92% and consist of the Phaedo (34%), followed by the Timaeus, Phaedrus 
and Republic.35 
 
II.  Philo’s Use of Plato 
 
The primary forum where the interplay between Philo’s Judaism and Platonism can be 
observed is his allegorical exegesis. Plato’s division of reality into a lower, mundane and sense-
perceptible sphere and a higher, heavenly and noetic one is of fundamental importance for Philo. In 
addition, the Alexandrian cuts and pastes freely from different dialogues both specific expressions 
and more general imagery that pleases him. This method makes it virtually certain he had committed 
large portions of Plato’s works to memory, for we cannot assume that, when a single sentence of 
Philo’s contains language from several dialogues, this is the result of consulting several scrolls.36 
Admittedly Philo also deviates from Plato in points of doctrine. Lists of such deviations have been 
presented by, e.g., Goodenough and Runia.37 The lists do not have much in common but both, on 
                                               
33 Runia (1986). 
34 Méasson (1986). 
35 Yli-Karjanmaa (2015). 
36 So also Dillon (1996), 140. 














questionable grounds, include a major tenet, reincarnation.38 That Philo could not accept the idea of 
human souls being born in animal bodies is clear, because his anthropology differs from Plato’s in 
the direction of Aristotle and the Stoics: animals do not possess νοῦς, which for Philo is the primary 
term for the rational part of the soul.39  
It is time to see in practice how Philo blends Plato with the Bible in his allegories by looking at what 
Philo says of Gen. 6:2 in Gig. 6-18. The biblical verse runs, in Philo’s Bible, “Now when the angels 
(ἄγγελοι; the LXX has ὑιοί, ‘sons’) of God saw the daughters of humans, that they were fair, they 
took wives for themselves of all that they chose.”40   
Runia has analyzed the structure of Philo’s allegorical treatises and made important 
observations.41 He gives the structure of Gig. 6-18 as follows:42 
 
(a) §6 citation of the main biblical lemma, Gen. 6:2 
(b) §6 initial observation (angels, demons, Moses)  
(c) §7-16 background information  
(d) §17 proof of doctrine secondary biblical lemma Ps. 77:49 [mode of transition verbal 
ἀγγέλους => ἀγγέλων πονηρῶν]  
(e) §17-18 detailed allegorical explanation. 
 
The “initial observation” (b) runs, “Those whom the philosophers designate ‘daemons,’ Moses is 
accustomed to call angels. These are souls that fly in the air.”43 This statement, which orientates the 
audience away from the pre-diluvian context, is a part of a set of notions which Philo repeats, with 
some variation, in the context of no less than five different biblical texts.44 The underlying scheme is 
that there are souls found in the element air, just like each of the other elements has its creatures, and 
some of these souls undergo incarnation—the foolish ones repeatedly in Somn.—while others, i.e., 
the angels, do not. This scheme is exposed to view to different degrees in different treatises. The idea 
that souls or daemons (or heroes in Plant.) are in the air Philo has probably been appropriated from 
Pythagorean or Platonist sources.45  
                                               
38 Goodenough’s justification is merely Philo’s “Jewish foundation.” Runia sees Philo replacing reincarnation with 
allegorical explanation. For a critique of his position, see Yli-Karjanmaa (2015), esp. 20-25 and 120-22. 
39 Opif. 73; Deus 45, 47; Anim. 85. For Plato νοῦς is not an essential part of the human being and can occur also in 
animals (Ti. 51e, 92c), whereas Aristotle considers it possible that it can be separate from the soul and immortal (De 
anima 413b25-28, 429a22-26, 430a22-23). According to Koester ([1995], 270) the view that the animals are devoid of 
νοῦς is a Stoic doctrine. 
40 Tr. New English Translation of the Septuagint. 
41 Runia (1987). See also Runia (1984), esp. pp. 238-44. A brief summary: In his allegorical treatises Philo, as a rule, 
goes through a series of main biblical lemmas (MBL). He often makes some initial observation to “break open” the verse 
in question and may give some background information before embarking on his actual allegory. He very often uses other 
biblical texts, secondary biblical lemmas (SBL), to explain the main one. These are linked with the MBL by a common 
word, or a theme, or both, and there is thus a verbal or thematic mode of transition (MOT). Usually Philo returns to the 
MBL before moving to the next one. For a recent application of these observations, see Geljon & Runia (2013), esp. pp. 
10-20. 
42 Runia (1987), 133. 
43 Tr. Winston (1981) as all quotations from Gig. (with occasional modifications). For a commentary, see Winston & 
Dillon (1983). 
44 These are, in addition to Gig. 6-18, Plant. 12-14 (Gen. 9:20), Somn. 1.134-141 (Gen. 28:12) and the little more distant 
parallels in Conf. 174-177 (Gen. 11:7) and (part of) QG 4.188 (Gen. 26:8). 
45 See Alexander Polyhistor’s compendium of Pythagorean teachings at Diogenes Laertius 8.25-35 and Augustine’s 
reference to the views of the Middle Platonist Varro in City of God 7.6. The notion can also function as an “attempt to 
systematize” various Platonic and Platonist views concerning incorporeal souls, as Runia (1986), 254 sees it. See further, 
 
 
Runia’s point (c) concerning §§ 7-16 seems to call for further analysis. I think the section 
should be seen in the light of Philo’s solution to the awkward biblical statement concerning angels:46 
Philo explains them as pleasure-oriented human souls (§§ 17-18; cf. §§ 19-20). But are §§ 7-16 
“background information” only, yet “necessary for the allegory”?47 The section unfolds the scheme 
of the airy souls which takes over once Philo encounters the word “angels.” The inclusion of air as 
the location of the souls is instrumental: it leads to the exposition of each of the four elements being 
the home of the creatures appropriate to it (derived from Ti. 39e-40a). Philo reinforces this by also 
alluding to the requirement in 41b that heaven is not imperfect: “For the universe must be animated 
through and through” (Gig. 7, elaborated in §§ 8-11).48 
In Gig. 13 Philo proceeds to the human souls’ incarnation and utilizes the Timaean image of 
the body as a river (Ti. 43ac). From the descent it is logical to continue to the ascent, but Philo has no 
use for Plato’s mythical “native stars” (42b), so he changes dialogues and speaks of the souls’ 
returning to their starting point, their correct philosophizing and their practice of dying to the bodily 
life (§§ 13-14) utilizing both the Phaedrus (248e-249a) and the Phaedo (67de, 80e).49 In §15 Philo 
returns to the wicked who have “never had a vision of the truly beautiful,” again echoing the 
Phaedrus (e.g., 247cd, 248bc, 249de). The section closes (§16) with a statement that souls exist in 
good as well as bad variety: the bad “angels” are not worthy of the appellation, whereas the real ones 
act as mediators between God and humans—an allusion to Smp. 202e.50 
At §17 Philo introduces as “testimony” the secondary biblical lemma, Ps. 78:49 (77:49 LXX) 
which mentions “wicked angels.”51 What Philo now supports with this text is the initial observation, 
reiterated in §16, of “angels” meaning souls.52 Only after this does Philo proceed to the actual 
allegorical interpretation based on the result he has reached, “wicked angels = bad souls.”  
The contents of the cento are in no way based on the main biblical lemma, only triggered by 
it.53 §§ 7-16 are thus more than just background information, but whether they are necessary for the 
                                                                                                                                                              
Runia (1986), 229 and Winston & Dillon (1983), 197-200. Méasson (1986), 405 speaks of a hypothetical, possibly 
fragmentary “commentaire du Timée par le Phèdre.” However, the variation in the mixtures of Platonic elements in the 
parallels (see n. 50) strongly points to the direction of Philo’s own creativity. Similarly Runia (1988), 292. 
46 Nikiprowetzky (1983), 11 puts it like this: “Mais alors comment peut-on entendre que des anges de Dieu aient épousé 
les passions des hommes?”. Passions is the interpretation of the “daughters” of Gen. 6:1 (Gig. 5), and it would be better 
not to juxtapose this explanatio with the following explanandum (“angels”). 
47 Runia (1987), 122, in a general description of Philo’s exegetical procedure of providing background information. 
48 Winston & Dillon (1983), 240-41 refer, as parallels to this section, to passages in Ti., Lg. and also Ax. In §12 Philo 
makes as statement on (real) angels, for which they point to Smp., Plt. and R. 
49 This is an example of how Philo turns a blind eye to a reference to pederasty. Plato writes in Phdr. 248e-249a: “For 
each soul returns to the place whence it came in ten thousand years [and not before] . . . , except the soul of him who has 
been a guileless philosopher or a philosophical pederast”—for whom reincarnation only lasts three thousand years. 
50 The Smp. passage is also drawn on in Plant. 14 and Somn. 1.141. The latter treatise features a Platonic cento which is 
even denser than the one in Gig., for in the space of c. 70 words in 1.137-139 Philo, in his most explicit description of 
reincarnation, manages to make identifiable references to Phd. 66c, 68b; Phdr. 246c; Smp. 211e and Ti. 41d, 44b as well 
as including other notions for which clear counterparts exist in these dialogues and Cra., Grg. and R. See Yli-Karjanmaa  
(2015), 130-43. 
51 Philo can be very selective in his use of a biblical lemma. Here its context and most of the contents are ignored. 
52 The return to the initial observation is reminiscent of Philo’s habit of eventually returning to the main biblical lemma. 
Another interesting observation is that this secondary lemma is not a case where “Moses is being explained via Moses” 
Runia (1987), 112. We may note too that the transition—from the initial observation to the secondary lemma—is not 
only verbal but also thematic. 
53 This is not an isolated case. In all of the parallels to Gig. 6-18 (see n. 44) Philo’s biblical basis is very narrow. In 
Plant., the whole section §§ 1-139 is an elaboration of a single word in the MBL (Gen. 9:20): “planted”; in Somn., the 
MBL (Gen. 28:12) speaks of ascending and descending angels; in Conf., it is the existence of angels that explains the 
plural verb form in Gen. 1:26 which is introduced as an SBL to help explain the corresponding plural in the MBL (Gen. 
 
 
allegory is debatable. For neither of the main elements in the interpretation “angels married daughters 
of humans = wicked people seek pleasures” is dependent on it: That “daughters” mean vice and 
passions was already the interpretation of Gen. 6:1 (Gig. 5), and this, coupled with the initial 
observation that the word “angels” denotes souls, means we are dealing with wicked souls. 
We next take another kind of example. In the De virtutibus (part of the Exposition of the Law) 
Philo discusses the nobility of birth (εὐγενεία) in §§ 187-227. He says it is not hereditary but depends 
on acquisition (§198) and illustrates this through biblical examples. Adam’s nobility was peerless, 
but it did not prevent the transgression which Philo in §§ 203-205 describes replacing the scriptural 
details with something else:  
Virt. 205: [H]e eagerly chose the false, shameful and evil things (τὰ κακά) disregarding those 
that are good and excellent and true, on which account he fittingly exchanged (ἀνθυπ-
ηλλάξατο) an immortal life (βίον) for a mortal one and, forfeiting (σφαλείς) blessedness and 
happiness (εὐδαιμονίας), promptly changed (μετέβαλεν) to an arduous (ἐπίπονον) and 
unfortunate (κακοδαίμονα) existence.54 
Cf. Ti. 42bc: And he that has lived his appointed time well shall return again to his abode in 
his native star, and shall gain a life (βίον) that is blessed (εὐδαίμονα) and congenial, but 
whoso has failed (σφαλείς) therein shall be changed (μεταβαλοῖ) into woman’s nature at the 
second birth; and if, in that shape, he still refraineth not from wickedness (κακίας) he shall be 
changed (μεταβαλοῖ) every time, according to the nature of his wickedness (κακύνοιτο), into 
some bestial form after the similitude of his own nature; nor in his changings shall he cease 
(ἀλλάττων) from woes (πόνων) until . . .  
We can note four main differences from the example in Gig.: there is now thematic similarity 
between Philo’s biblical base text and Plato, there is no explicit interpretation but rather retelling, 
only one dialogue is utilized, and, rather than Platonic expressions recognizable as such, this is a case 
of an accumulation of individual words.55 In each case, the dire consequences of an initial, ethically 
unsuccessful incarnation are depicted.56 Given Philo’s endorsement of reincarnation, it seems he 
wants to subtly remind his audience of it. 
The last example concerns the utilization of a dialogue as a whole. As we saw above, when 
it comes to the soul and its fate, the Phaedo is very important for Philo. But given that most of 
Philo’s allegories are in one way or the other related to the soul, we could expect a higher overall 
ranking for the dialogue.57 Admittedly, Plato discusses the soul in other dialogues as well, but, in my 
                                                                                                                                                              
11:7); finally in QG 4.188 it is the “game” Isaac played with Rebecca in Gen. 26:8 that leads Philo’s mind to “festive 
enjoyments of the perfect,” enjoyed also during and after their incarnation. I find it strained to think the Platonic scheme 
is inherent in these verses; Philo is rather using every opportunity to present it to his audience. 
54
 Tr. Wilson (2010), 86 with some emendations.  
55 To my knowledge, the connection between these passages has not been noted in previous scholarship. Although the 
clearest, it is not the only link between what Philo says about the first man in Virt. and what Plato says in Ti. In §204 
Philo states,  
…his father (πατήρ) was no mortal but the eternal God (ὁ ἀίδιος θεός), whose image he was in a sense, in virtue of 
the ruling mind within the soul (τὸν ἡγεμόνα νοῦν ἐν ψυχῇ). Yet though he should have followed 
(ἐπακολουθήσαντα) as far as he could in the steps of his Parent’s (τοῦ γεννήσαντος) virtues . . . 
Compare Ti. 37c: “the Father that engendered [the Soul of the world] (ὁ γεννήσας πατήρ) perceived it in motion and 
alive, a thing of joy to the eternal gods (τῶν ἀιδίων θεῶν),” and 41c: ”Now so much of [the mortal creatures] as it is 
proper to designate ‘immortal,’ the part we call divine which rules (ἡγεμονοῦν) supremely in those who are fain to follow 
(ἕπεσθαι) justice always and yourselves . . .” 
56 Philo again repeats a scheme, now that of exchanging happy immortality for unhappy mortality, in discussing different 
biblical verses (but now the scheme itself is not Platonic). The most important parallels are Opif. 151-152 (see Runia 
[2001], 359), Leg. 3.52 (see Yli-Karjanmaa [2016]), Plant. 37 and QG 1.45. 
57 The words ψυχή and νοῦς alone make up 0.6% of Philo’s Greek oeuvre. 
 
 
view, the significance of the Phaedo for Philo has not yet been fully uncovered. Its importance does 
not lie in the narrative of Socrates’ last moments or in proving the soul’s immortality—such a basic 
belief needed for Philo no proof. But there are a number of Phaedonic ideas in Philo’s treatises which 
are fundamental for the Alexandrian’s basic ethos.58 
In Gig. we already encountered the concept of philosophizing rightly which Philo uses many 
times.59 In the Phaedo it is thrice combined with practising death, which appears also independently 
in the dialogue.60 Philo too uses the combination to describe the upward journey of the God-seeking 
soul in which both correct ideas and correct actions play an important role.61 The fundamental idea of 
Philo’s ethics is for the soul to orientate away from the sense-perceptible towards to the noetic, or, as 
Socrates puts it in the Phaedo, from “visible” to “invisible.”62 
We can also discern in Philo Phaedonic themes that can be broadly grouped under 
anthropology.63 The deceitfulness of the senses is one.64 However, quite often he gives it a slightly 
un-Platonic slant: the senses are actually prone to be deceived, and once that happens, they drag the 
mind with them.65 Cf. Gen. 3:13 where Eve (allegorized as sense-perception) says that the serpent 
(pleasure), “deceived me”.66 In the Phaedo this theme is linked with soul’s identification with the 
body: “each pleasure or pain nails [the soul] as with a nail to the body,” and such a soul “can never 
depart in purity to the other world, but must always go away contaminated with the body,” eventually 
reincarnated.67 In a few Philonic passages an intriguingly similar thought is expressed. E.g., those 
who manage to “quit the earthly region . . . [are] carrying in their train no bodily deficiencies,” while 
for the wicked soul (apparently in the afterlife) it applies that “the evils with which it has grown up 
[are] in a certain sense its members and grow together with it.”68 
To summarize Philo’s use of Plato’s texts: Three major themes come together in the Timaeus: 
the two levels of reality, the creation of the lower in accordance with the higher and the structure and 
                                               
58 Some of these are discussed in more detail in Yli-Karjanmaa (2015), esp. 122-24 and 150-52. 
59 Phd. 64a, 67de, 69d, 80e, 82c (also Phdr. 249a and Ep. 7 326a): see Gig. 14, Deus 22, Agr. 104, Plant. 24, Decal. 58 
and Spec. 1.32. 
60 Phd. 64a, 67e, 80e, and 65ac, 66a, 67ad, 81a, respectively. 
61 Gig. 14, Plant. 24-25. In both, clear echoes of the Phaedrus are also present. Philo refers to the practice of death in 
different ways: he may alter the vocabulary but keep the idea (Leg. 1.103, Det. 49, Conf.82) or keep Plato’s wording but 
give it a different meaning (Det. 34, QG 4.173). These correspond to the different conceptions of life to which one dies to: 
the body-oriented life (the first three); the physical life more generally (Det.) or that of virtue (QG). 
62 E.g., 79ab. 
63 In addition, terminological influence of the Phaedo can be seen in Philo’s frequently defining death as the separation of 
soul from body using the verbs χωρίζω and διαζεύγνυμι and their cognates (67cd, 88b; also R. 609d, Ep. 7 335a; cf. Leg. 
1.105, 2.77; Plant. 25, Fug. 55, Abr. 258, Virt. 76). Philo is the first to use Plato’s adjective “body-loving” (φιλοσώματος, 
68b; twelve occurrences in Philo). Furthermore, Socrates repeatedly refers to reincarnation in the Phaedo using either the 
combination of πάλιν with γίγνομαι/γένεσις or the verb ἀναβιώσκομαι (70cd, 72a, 113a, and 71e, 72ad, respectively). I 
have concluded that in two out of Philo’s four fairly explicit approvals of the doctrine these have served as models, and in 
one of them Socrates’ juxtaposition of sleep and death is also significant. The passages are Cher. 114 (παλιγγενεσία) and 
fr. 7.3 Harris (ἀναβίωσις with the combination of sleep and death, for which see esp. Phd. 71c). See Yli-Karjanmaa 
(2015), 150-67 and 202-5. 
64 Phd. 83a; cf. Conf. 126, Spec. 4.188. 
65 Gig. 18, Ebr. 46. 
66 Opif. 165-166, Leg. 3.59-68, QG 1.46-47. 
67 Phd. 83d, 81ac. 
68 Det. 27, QG 2.61. There is some evidence to suggest that in Philo the elimination of the “bodily” parts of the soul may 
be a prerequisite of salvation; see Yli-Karjanmaa (2015), 85-90. This idea also bears some resemblance to the notion of 
“double death” (mentioned by Plutarch in connection with Xenocrates’ ideas in De facie 943a ff.) whereby the soul is 
first separated from the body and then the mind from the soul. 
 
 
the journey of the soul. These Philo adopts, and adapts to his exegetical purposes, drawing heavily 
also on the account of the fall and rise of the soul in the Phaedrus as well as the overarching ethos of 
orientation away from the bodily sphere in order to permanently reach the intelligible one in the 
Phaedo. 
 
III.  Conclusion 
 
It has been said that for Philo the Middle Platonism of Alexandria and his ancestral faith “were 
two ways of expressing a single vision of truth.”69 But as the examples above have aimed to show, the 
(sacred and inviolate) biblical text is Philo’s explanandum, and what the explanatio to a large degree 
consists of are Platonic expressions and ideas as well as their Platonist developments. The process of 
allegorical interpretation gives Philo much freedom; we have seen how narrow a biblical basis he 
sometimes needs and how he offers the same scheme as the interpretation of entirely different verses. 
The singleness of the vision is only the end result of the process, and in analyzing its contents it is 
reasonable to lay more weight on what the biblical text ends up meaning than on Philo’s professed 
allegiance to its letter.70 And we are not just dealing with individual interpretations but a whole 
worldview with its two levels, the earthly and the heavenly.  
Describing Philo’s Moses as “a great Middle Platonist” thus seems fairly accurate.71 But would 
Philo himself say he was only “borrowing back” what the Greek philosophers had taken from 
Moses?72 Given the statements to this effect by Philo’s predecessor Aristobulus more than a century 
and a half before him and the echoes found in Philo himself, it may have been a Jewish convention to 
profess such a view.73 Yet in Philo’s exegetical praxis its significance in relation to Plato is negligible. 
Philo was a loyal Jew committed Jewish customs, and he denounced those who forsook the 
literal interpretation of the Mosaic law in favor of the allegorical—even if his criticism is rather mild 
and perhaps primarily aims at securing the social acceptability of practicing allegory.74 There is no 
reason to posit a contradiction between the specifically Jewish characteristics in Philo’s endeavor, such 
as the spirit of a personal relationship with God or the importance of God’s grace for salvation, and the 
incorporation of his favorite philosophical ideas into the allegories. He was both a Jew and a Platonist, 




                                               
69 Sterling (1993), 111. 
70 An example of the latter is, “you will not find a single pointless expression” by Moses (Leg. 3.147). Cf. Runia (1986), 
328, regarding Det. 79-90 and Plant. 16-22, passages which  
show Philo at the peak of his powers. The role which Plato’s doctrine of man, as presented in the Timaeus, plays in 
Philo’s thought is revealed with more than usual clarity. In order to show man’s exceptional place in the structure 
of the cosmos, Philo centres his account around the two primary anthropological passages of the Mosaic creation 
story. But in his endeavour to explain what these texts actually tell us about man’s nature he resorts to the two 
Platonic accounts of man which he knew best, the Timaeus and the Phaedrus myth.  
(Emphasis original.) Granted, Runia speaks of “more than usual clarity,” but this applies to the degree to which the role 
of Plato’s doctrine is revealed. 
71 See above, n. 18. 
72 So Dillon (1993), 152; cf. (1996), 143, 148-49. 
73 E.g., “It seems to me that Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato with great care follow [Moses] in all respects” (Aristobulus, 
fr. 4 in Charlesworth (2009), 2.839 = fr. 2 in the TLG, preserved by Eusebius in Praep. ev.13.12.4.)  For similar 
statements in Philo, see, e.g., Leg. 1.108 (Heraclitus), Prob. 59 (Zeno).  
74 Migr. 86-94. 
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